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Relief from Final Judgment Under Rule 60(b)(l) Due to Judicial
Errors of Law
Rule 60(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
a court may relieve a party from final judgment for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" within a "reasonable" time not
to exceed one year. 1 There is significant disagreement among the federal circuit courts of appeals as to whether rule 60(b)(l) should be
applicable to judicial errors oflaw.2 Even those circuits that recognize
judicial error as proper cause to invoke rule 60(b)(l) disagree about
both the types of judicial error covered under the rule3 and the time
constraints within which such a motion must be made. 4
This Note seeks to resolve these conflicts by proposing a sensible
reading of rule 60(b)(1) that reconciles the basic philosophies underlying differing interpretations of the rule. Part I examines the history of
rule 60(b)(l) and the policies espoused by the courts and commentators in considering whether the rule should be applied to judicial errors of law and concludes that courts should employ the rule to
correct obvious5 judicial errors of law. Part II recommends a broad
scope for rule 60(b)(1) motions, proposing that the only type of alleged
judicial error outside the reach of such a motion should be error induced by interpretation of ambiguous statutes or case law precedents.
Part II suggests that this latter type of error is more appropriately
examined in the appellate process or in a rule 59 6 motion for new trial
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(l) (adopted 1937; amended 1946, 1948). Rule 60(b) states in part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party . • . from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for . . • mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. . . • The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and . . . not more than one
year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.
Under the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 Congress delegated the power to make procedural
rules to the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). In 1935 the Supreme Court appointed an
advisory committee to prepare and submit a draft of recommended rules, and in 1942 the Court
designated a permanent committee to advise the Court with respect to amendments or additions
to the rules. As the final step in the process, the Supreme Court reports the rules it wishes to
come into force to Congress, in accordance with the Rules Enabling Act. "The existing situation
in the federal courts • . . may be described as judicial rulemaking pursuant to a legislative delegation and subject to a congressional veto." 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE§ 1001, at 30 (1969). The validity of this legislative veto arrangement is questionable after Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
2. See note 43 infra. A judicial error of law might occur, for example, when a judge ignores
or is unaware of a change in controlling decisional law. See Schildhaus v. Moe, 335 F.2d 529,
531 (2d Cir. 1964).
3. See note 43 infra.
4. See notes 56-59 infra and accompanying text.
5. See notes 44-47 infra and accompanying text for examples of "obvious" errors.
6. See note 25 infra for the scope of FED. R. CIV. P. 59.
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or change in the judgment. Part III examines the question of the time
period during which a rule 60(b)(l) motion ought be allowed. It argues that obvious errors of law should be correctable under a rule
60(b)(l) motion made within the time permitted for an appeal, and if
an appeal is taken, made up until the appellate court begins review of
the case, within an outside limit of one year.
I.

RULE

60(b)(l)

APPLICABILITY TO ERRORS OF LAW

A. Language and History of Rule 60(b)(l)

The text of rule 60(b)(l) does not specifically authorize motions
based on errors of law, but under its language the rule has a potentially broad scope. Major operative terms such as "mistake" and "inadvertence" are not independently defined and can easily be
interpreted to encompass errors of law. In addition, the history of rule
60(b)(l) suggests that a 1946 amendment to the rule was intended to
provide for motions to correct judicial errors of law. The rule originally provided relief to a party only for that party's mistake or
inadvertence. 7 The advisory committee broadened the rule, feeling
that relief under it should be given for mistakes of people other than
the party filing the motion. 8 The amendment can be interpreted as an
attempt to simplify the method of obtaining relief from mistake,
whether by a party or by a judge. 9 Therefore, use of a rule 60(b)(l)
motion to correct judicial errors of law is certainly not contrary to the
rule's language and is arguably required by the intent behind the 1946
amendment to the rule.
B.

Policy Considerations in Applying Rule 60(b)(l) to Judicial
Errors of Law

Because the language of rule 60(b)(l) allows a wide range of interpretations, any inquiry into the rule's proper scope must center on pol7. The original version of the rule, in pertinent part, reads:
On motion the court . . . may relieve a party • . . from a judgment • • . taken against him
through his mistake . . . • This rule does not limit the power of a court . • • to entertain an
action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (emphasis added). Under a savings clause providing that the rule did not
limit the power of the court "to entertain an action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or
proceeding," relief from judicial error apparent on the record could be obtained under a bill of
review, a form of action abolished by the 1946 amendment. 7 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 60.1S[S] (2d ed. 198S) [hereinafter cited as 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC•
TICE]. The history of the rule is comprehensively analyzed in 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra, ~ 60.10.
8. The qualifying pronoun "his" has been eliminated on the basis that it is too restrictive,
and that the subdivision [(b)] should include the mistake or neglect of [people other than the
party filing the motion] which may be just as material and call just as much for supervisory
jurisdiction as where the judgment is taken against the party through his mistake, inadver•
tence, etc.
FED. R Civ. P. 60(b) advisory committee note (emphasis in original).
9. See 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 7, ~ 60.22[3].

May 1985]

Note -

Judicial Errors of Law

1573

icy considerations. Courts and commentators have advocated and
weighed various policy considerations in deciding whether rule
60(b)(l) ought to apply to judicial errors of law. These considerations
include conserving both judicial and party resources, 10 preventing the
use of rule 60(b)(l) as a substitute for appeal, 11 ensuring the continued
viability of rule 59, 12 encouraging speedy disposition of cases, 13 and
preserving the finality of judgments. 14 Use of timely rule 60(b)(l) motions to correct obvious errors of law made by the judge at trial can
satisfactorily balance all of these policy considerations.
The interest in conservation of judicial and party resources is best
served by allowing this use of a rule 60(b)(l) motion in the trial
court. 15 Principles of both efficiency and comity weigh in favor of allowing the trial judge to correct his or her own error before an appeal
is taken. 16 The use of a rule 60(b)(l) motion saves the parties' time
and money by giving them a final adjudication on the merits in some
cases months or even years earlier than if the correction had to be
made on appeal. 17 In addition, by employing a judge already familiar
with the merits of the case, a rule 60(b)(l) motion prevents judicial
inconvenience and expense by avoiding a duplication of effort in the
trial and appellate courts. 18 To these efficiency considerations the factor of comity must be added. Allowing trial judges to correct their
own errors of law in clear cases is almost always preferable to the
corrective action of appellate benches. 19
It might be argued that a rule 60(b)(l) motion will not conserve
resources because the nonmoving party will subsequently appeal the
10. See, e.g., Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., 542 F.2d 928, 931 (5th Cir. 1976) ("allowing
the district court to consider the motion may be more efficient in the long run").
11. See, e.g., Swam v. United States, 327 F.2d 431, 433 (7th Cir.) ("Rule 60(b) was not
intended to be an alternative method to obtain review by appeal or as a means of enlarging by
indirection the time for appeal."), cerL denied, 379 U.S. 852 (1964).
12. See, e.g., Silk v. Sandoval, 435 F.2d 1266, 1268 (1st Cir.) (Interpreting rule 60(b)(l) to
extend the ten-day time limit of rule 59 "loses sight of the complementary interest in speedy
disposition and finality, clearly intended by Rule 59."), cerL denied, 402 U.S. 1012 (1971).
13. See, e.g., Silk v. Sandoval, 435 F.2d 1266, 1268 (1st Cir.), cerL denied, 402 U.S. 1012
(1971).
14. See, e.g., Parks v. United States Life & Credit Corp., 677 F.2d 838, 841 (11th Cir. 1982)
("The strong interest in the finality of litigation demands rejection of appellant's suggestion" that
a rule 60(b)(l) motion can be filed any time within one year.).
15. As Professor Moore states, "why should not the trial court have the power to correct its
own judicial error under 60(b)(l) within a reasonable time . . . and thus avoid the inconvenience
and expense of an appeal by the party which the trial court is now convinced should prevail?" 7
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcnCE, supra note 7, 1j 60.22[3], at 60-185-86.
16. See, e.g., Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., 542 F.2d 928, 931 (5th Cir. 1976).
17. Cf. United States v. 329.73 Acres of Land, 695 F.2d 922, 925 (5th Cir. 1983) ("One
purpose of Rule 60(b)(l) is to permit the trial court to reconsider and correct 'obvious errors of
law' without forcing the parties to engage the machinery of appeal.").
18. See Fackelman v. Bell, 564 F.2d 734, 736 (5th Cir. 1977) ("For such obvious errors of
law, it might well waste judicial energy to engage the machinery of appeal."); note 15 supra.
19. See note 15 supra.
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same point. 20 However, appeal by the party opposing the motion is
unlikely in cases of obvious error for three reasons. First, the trial
judge, in allowing the motion, has already recognized an earlier mistake - as have at least one and probably both of the litigating parties. 21 Second, specific and detailed consideration of the issue of law
has gone into the amended decision, and this increased scrutiny will
usually lead to a more correct judgment.22 Finally, the fact that
judges are loath to reverse themselves and admit mistake suggests that
an error corrected by a sustained rule 60(b)(l) motion is, in all likelihood, quite glaring. Allowing a party to file a rule 60(b)(l) motion
rather than forcing an appeal for an obvious error of law will certainly
not result in more appeals than would otherwise be taken. 23 Quite the
contrary, because the party aggrieved at the trial stage will no longer
have an incentive to appeal, many appeals will be eliminated on challenged points that can be resolved earlier in the better or obviously
correct way. 24
Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a
party may file a motion for a new trial or a motion to alter or amend a
judgment no later than ten days after entry of the judgment.25 Some
courts express fear that if a party could obtain relief from a mistake of
law by a rule 60(b)(l) motion until the time for appeal expires,26 the
continued viability of rule 59 would be threatened. 27 The concern is
20. See Note, Federal Rule 60(b): Finality of Civil Judgements v. Self-Correction by District
Court of Judicial E"or of Law, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 98, 104 (1967). This analysis is not,
however, necessarily out of line with the recommendation of this Note, which contends that the
types of errors that are likely to be appealed regardless of the trial court's decision - those
involving the interpretation of ambiguous precedent and points of law - remain outside the
limits of a rule 60(b)(l) motion. See Part II infra.
21. The interpretation of rule 60(b)(l) recommended by this Note centers on the applicability
of the rule to obvious errors oflaw. See Part II infra. The moving party has recognized the error
and, because the error is obvious, the trial judge and the opposing party will easily recognize the
error upon notice from the moving party.
22. Moreover, a trial judge considering a rule 60(b)(l) motion has the opportunity to focus
on the specific issue before him or her without regard to the additional questions of law and fact
presented at the trial.
23. The recommendation of this Note emphasizes the usefulness of the rule 60(b)(l) motion
as a practical alternative to appeal within the appeal period. See notes 34-37 infra and accompa•
nying text. If the motion is denied, the party is still within the appeal period and will, in all
likelihood, appeal the obvious error.
24. See Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., S42 F.2d 928, 931 (5th Cir. 1976):
More significantly, allowing the district court to consider the motion may be more efficient
in the long run. . . . [I]n some instances a decision by the district court on the motion will
wash out the appeal. Permitting the district court to have the first bite at the issue is a direct
way of reaching a problem which otherwise can [only] be attacked circuitously.
25. FED. R. Clv. P. 59(b) states: "A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10
days after the entry of the judgment." Similarly, FED. R. C1v. P. S9(e) states: "A motion to
alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment."
26. The usual time limit for filing an appeal is 30 days. See note 56 infra.
27. See, e.g.. Scola v. Boat Frances, R., Inc., 618 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1980); Hahn v. Becker,
S51 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1977); Silk v. Sandoval, 43S F.2d 1266 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
1012 (1971); Swam v. United States, 327 F.2d 431 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 852 (1964).
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that the ten-day time limits of rule 59 would be rendered useless if the
"reasonable time" limit of rule 60(b)(l) enveloped the substantive
scope of rule 59. 28
However, a properly invoked rule 59 motion will retain its independent vitality even if rule 60(b)(l) is used to allow correction of
judicial errors. First, rule 59(a) will continue to be the only dependable method of seeking a new trial. 29 Second, rule 59(e) will remain the
only alternative for seeking reconsideration of an ambiguous point of
law by the trial court without a new trial. 30 Third, rule 59(e) deals
with a broader array of amendment-seeking factors (including many
discretionary trial level rulings) than does rule 60(b)(l). 31 Finally, if a
party wants to toll the running of the time for appeal, the sole alternative is a motion under rule 59, because a rule 60(b)(l) motion does not
affect the finality of judgment.32 It is already well recognized that
there is considerable overlap between rules 59 and 60(b)(1); 33 yet,
But see Bank of Cal. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 709 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1983), in which a
motion to correct a judgment filed 11 months after judgment was held timely under rule 60(b)(1).
The trial judge mistakenly used a form that said that dismissal was on the merits when, in fact,
the judge had not determined the merits of a pendent claim. The judge denied the plaintiff's
motion to amend the judgment which was made within ten days of judgment, but one month
later entered a clarification order making the previous judgment without prejudice as to the
pendent claim. Confusion ensued and the appellate court held the second motion, 11 months
after judgment, to be timely. On petition for rehearing, the court stated that this decision was
not contrary to Swam v. United States, 327 F.2d at 431, or other similar precedent, because those
decisions held merely that a rule 60(b)(l) motion could not be used as a substitute for appeal.
The court further confused the basis for its holding by stating that the situation was more aptly
described as a clerical error rather than an error of law, implying that rule 60(a) (which allows
correction of clerical errors at any time) rather than rule 60(b)(l) controlled.
28. [The view] that "mistake" means any type of judicial error, makes relief under the rule
for error of law as extensive as that available under Rule 59(e), which permits motions to
"alter or amend judgments." Obviously any such motion presupposes a mistake. Indeed,
the argument advanced is that a broad construction of "mistake" beneficially extends the
ten-day limit for motions under Rule 59(e). Calling this a benefit loses sight of the complementary interest in speedy disposition and finality, clearly intended by Rule 59. Attempts to
allay criticism on this score by saying that the "reasonable time" for filing a Rule 60(b)
motion when it seeks reconsideration on a point oflaw is the appeal period, are an acknowledgement of the extent to which this construction of mistake undermines Rule 59(e).
Silk v. Sandoval, 435 F.2d 1266, 1268 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 402 U.S. 1012 (1971). See also
Swam v. United States, 327 F.2d 431,433 (7th Cir.) (plaintiff must file timely appeal or timely
rule 59 motion to challenge district court's alleged error of law), cert denied, 379 U.S. 852
(1964); Note, supra note 20, at 100 (commending the Seventh Circuit's approach, lest rule 59's
time constraints assuring finality of judgments be undermined).
29. Rule 60(b)(l) does not provide for relief in the form of a new trial. See note 1 supra.
30. 6A J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & G. GROTHEER, JR., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1159.12[1]
(2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as 6A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE].
31. Rule 59(e) can be used to change discretionary rulings of the court, such as to change a
dismissal with prejudice to a dismissal without prejudice, or vice versa; to include an award of
costs; to vacate a dismissal and allow amendment of a complaint; or to provide other types of
relief. See 6A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 30, 11 59.12[1].
32. "A motion under [rule 60(b)] does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation." FED. R. Crv. P. 60(b). Cf Communist Party of Ind. v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441,
445-46 (1974) (a rule 59(e) motion extends the time for appeal by suspending the finality of the
judgment).
33. See 6A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 30, 1111 59.04[7] & 60.03[3].
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mere shared purposes ought not to prevent application of rule 60(b)(l)
to judicial errors of law.
Another policy concern is that the use of rule 60(b)(l) to correct
judicial errors of law should not be allowed to substitute for appeal. 34
However, a motion to correct obvious judicial errors of law at the trial
court level does not constitute a harmful substitute for appeal. The
motion is, indeed, being used as a substitute for appeal, but it is only a
substitute in the same sense as other provisions allowing a trial court
to amend its own judgments - it provides an efficient alternative to
appeal. 35 The motion would be a harmful substitute for appeal only if
a party does not file an appeal, waits until after the time for appeal has
run, and then seeks to reopen the case with a rule 60(b)(1) motion. In
such a situation, the motion would undermine the time requirements
of the appeal process. 36 However, limiting the scope of rule 60(b)(l) in
this context to obvious errors37 and limiting the time period in which
such a motion can be used to the time allowed for appeal3 8 will eliminate any motivation to use a rule 60(b)(l) motion as a substitute for
the normal appeal process.
Finally, contrary to the arguments that some have advanced, 39 the
use of a rule 60(b)(1) motion for the correction of judicial errors of law
does not undermine any systemic interest in finality of judgments. The
concern for finality centers on the "interest that each controversy
eventually come to an end and the courts and the parties be left to
proceed to other matters." 40 The use of a rule 60(b)(l) motion to correct obvious judicial errors does not undermine this interest because
the party seeking to use the motion would almost certainly file an appeal to correct an obvious error of law if not offered the option of
proceeding under rule 60(b)(l). 41 Thus, there would be no finality
34. See, e.g., Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 699 F.2d 693 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 826 (1983); United States v. 329.73 Acres of Land, 695 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1983); Fox v.
Brewer, 620 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1980); Swam v. United States, 327 F.2d 431 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 852 (1964).
35. Several other rules are technically substitutes for appeal. See FED. R. C1v. P. 59(a) ("[a]
new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues [on motion
served not later than ten days after the entry of judgment]"); FED. R. C1v. P. 59(e) ("[a] motion
to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than ten days after entry of judgment");
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(a) ("clerical mistakes . . . may be corrected by the court at any time").
These alternative remedies promote efficient justice - just as the recommended use of a rule
60(b)(l) motion would do - without undermining the appeal process.
36. See, e.g., Steinhoffv. Harris, 698 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1983); Parks v. United States Life &
Credit Corp., 677 F.2d 838 (11th Cir. 1982); Capital Realty Invs., Inc. v. Watson, 608 F.2d 1137
(8th Cir. 1979); Hoffman v. Celebrezze, 405 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1969); Schildhaus v. Moe, 335
F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1964).
37. See notes 43-47 infra and accompanying text.
38. See note 60 infra and accompanying text.
39. See Note, supra note 20, at 102.
40. See 6A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 30, ~ 60.02.
41. See Barrier v. Beaver, 712 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1983); Parks v. United States Life & Credit
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even if use of a rule 60(b)(l) motion were denied. In addition, the
interest in finality must be balanced against the interest in a correct
decision after full consideration;42 by definition, an obvious error of
law by the trial judge does not satisfy this interest in correctness.
IL

TYPES OF ERROR PROPERLY INCLUDED IN A RULE
MOTION

60(b)(l)

Once it is resolved that some judicial errors should be correctable
under a rule 60(b)(l) motion, the issue of what types of error should be
correctable by such a motion and what types should properly be left
for the appellate process or a rule 59 motion remains. This Note argues that the trial judge should be allowed to correct all obvious errors
of law under rule 60(b)(l).43 Ignoring a change in controlling decisional law, 44 omitting interest on an award, 45 using the wrong time
period to calculate benefits, 46 and misapplying benefit classifications47
are examples of obvious error. In contrast, decisions based on sparse
Corp., 677 F.2d 838 (11th Cir. 1982); Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., 542 F.2d 928 (5th Cir.
1976).
42. See 6A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 30, 11 60.02.
43. Obvious errors are variously characterized as simply "errors oflaw," e.g., Perez v. Duesberg-Bosson Co., 78 F.R.D. 439,441 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (erroneous jury instruction confusing strict
liability with negligence); "fundamental misconceptions of law," e.g., 11 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2866, at 178 (1973); "errors obvious on the
record" (from the old equitable bill of review, abolished in the federal courts by the 1946 amendment to rule 60), see 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 7, 11 60.16[8]; or ''.judicial
inadvertence," e.g., Capital Realty Invs., Inc. v. Watson, 608 F.2d 1137, 1143 (8th Cir. 1979)
(failure to award interest as constituting judicial inadvertence); see also 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra note 7, 11 60.22[3], at 60-186 ("The cases that have dealt with the matter have
held that when the mistake may fairly be characterized as the product of inadvertence, it is
correctable within a reasonable time . . . ."); cf. Gila River Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 368
F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1966) (The court mistakenly interchanged the use of the words ''judgment"
and "verdict" in its damage award order.); Hoffman v. Celebrezze, 405 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1969)
(omission of interest on award of past Social Security benefits).
The circuits have split on the issue of what judicial errors can be subject to a rule 60(b)(l)
motion. The Eighth Circuit has held that judicial inadvertence is the only type of judicial error
that can be corrected by such a motion. See Fox v. Brewer, 620 F.2d 177, 180 (8th Cir. 1980).
The Fifth Circuit has held that only a "fundamental misconception of the law" or ''judicial
inadvertence" are correctable judicial mistakes under rule 60(b)(l). See, e.g., Lairsey v. Advance
Abrasives Co., 542 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1976) (court failing to follow controlling decisional law
displays fundamental misconception of the law); Meadows v. Cohen, 409 F.2d 750 (5th Cir.
1969) (wrong time period used in calculating Social Security benefits amounts to judicial inadvertence). The Third Circuit appears to allow correction of any type of judicial error, even an
erroneous decision in the face of ambiguous precedent. See Sleek v. J.C. Penney Co., 292 F.2d
256 (3d Cir. 1961) (reconsideration of default judgment denied by trial judge on ground that he
thought he had no authority to do so; reversed by appellate court on ground that trial judge did
have authority).
44. Lairsey v. Advance Abrasive Co., 542 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1976); Schildhaus v. Moe, 335
F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1964).
45. Capital Realty Invs., Inc. v. Watson, 608 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1979); Hoffman v. Celebrezze, 405 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1969).
46. Meadow v. Cohen, 409 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1969).
47. Steinhoff v. Harris, 698 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1983).
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or ambiguous precedent should be challenged on appeal or, at the discretion of the trial judge, through a rule 59 motion. 48 This recommendation is based primarily on pragmatic considerations of proper
division of labor49 within the judicial system. Under the principle of
division of labor, the greatest judicial efficiency is achieved when, in a
conceptual sense, the trial court decides the facts and applies the facts
to the law, while the appellate court, in addition to its reviewing role,
decides ambiguous questions of law on the basis of policy considerations. so In addition to saving judicial resources through greater efficiency of the appeal process, this assignment of tasks has the effect of
saving judicial and party resources by eliminating many appeals
altogether. 51
Alternatively, freeing the trial court from the burden of rehearing
an ambiguous point of law alleviates duplication of effort by the trial
and appellate courts. It is better to let the appellate court deal with
ambiguous points of law after the trial court has made a decision one
way or another, because the question is likely to be appealed with or
without any change in decision by the trial court. 52 The appellate
court must start fresh with the analysis, regardless of the trial court
decision, so the trial court rehearing on the point is virtually useless. 53
In addition, appellate review is the only available medium for clarification and guidance to other trial courts dealing with similar issues.
Therefore, to conserve judicial time and effort, it is best to have the
48. Courts have denied rule 60(b)(l) motions due to the absence of obvious errors of law
when the following legal issues were disputed: the appropriate interest rate, in United States v.
329.73 Acres of Land, 695 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1983); the alleged premature shutting off of discovery, a statutory definition of "employer," the law of conflicts, and the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, in Alvestad v. Monsanto Co., 671 F.2d 908 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1070
(1982); dismissal for failure to join an indispensable party, in Silk v. Sandoval, 435 F.2d 1266 (1st
Cir.), cert denied, 402 U.S. 1012 (1971); and a strict liability jury instruction, in Perez v. Duesberg-Bosson Co., 78 F.R.D. 439 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
49. "In essence, the principle [of division of labor] states that the greatest efficiency of production can be achieved when the overall organizational task is divided so that each worker
performs one small subtask or specialized job." Brass, Job Design and Redesign, in SCIENTISTS,
ENGINEERS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 265, 269 (T. Connolly ed. 1983). As applied to the judicial
function, this principle requires that the trial court decide, at a maximum, issues of fact and
obvious questions of law. Cf Lairsey v. Advance Abrasive Co., 542 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1976)
(trial judge in better position than appellate court to determine whether recent Georgia Supreme
Court decision should be applied retroactively to the case at bar). On the other hand, questions
involving subtle policy weighing are best left to the appellate court.
50. In addition to policy considerations, the appellate court is obviously bound by higher
court precedent and statutory authority. However, the greater the ambiguity of this precedent,
the more leeway the appellate court has to apply policy considerations.
51. See notes IS & 20 supra.
52. A partY will normally weigh his or her resources against his or her likelihood of success
on appeal. The more ambiguous the precedent, the closer the party comes to having a SO%
chance of success. Therefore, ambiguity increases the likelihood of appeal.
53. On issues of law the appeals court is not bound by the lower court's analysis. See SA J.
MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 52.03[2] (2d ed. 1985) (conclusions of law
are not binding).
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more authoritative pronouncement of the appellate court on the ambiguous issues.

Ill.

THE PROPER TIME FOR FILING A RULE

60(b)(l)

MOTION

Assuming rule 60(b)(1) applies to the correction of obvious judicial
errors of law, the issue remains as to the time period during which the
motion should be allowed. Policy considerations espoused by the
courts and commentators in determining the proper time constraints
include the same considerations raised with regard to the scope of the
rule: an interest in finality, concern about the use of rule 60(b)(l) as a
substitute for appeal, and an interest in the continued viability of rule
59. 54 Consideration should obviously also be given to the language of
the rule itself, which provides for use of a rule 60(b)(l) motion within
a "reasonable" time, not to exceed one year. 55 Among courts that do
allow use of rule 60(b)(1) to correct judicial errors, the majority maintain that the motion must be filed within the time allowed for notice of
appeal. 56 Others hold that this avenue is available until the appeal
goes to judgment if an appeal is filed. 57 Two circuits have applied the
ten-day limit for rule 59 motions to rule 60(b)(l) motions, 58 and one
circuit has held that the only per se limit, even when no appeal is filed,
is the stated one-year limit, with each case to be determined according
to its own facts. 5 9
This Note argues that if no appeal is filed, a rule 60(b)(l) motion is
"seasonable" if it is filed within the time allowed for appeal. If an
appeal is filed, a rule 60(b)(l) motion ought to be allowed until the
appellate court actually begins review of the case. An outside limit of
one year should apply in all cases. 60
54. See notes 11-14 supra and accompanying text.
55. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
56. See Barrier v. Beaver, 712 F.2d 231, 234 (6th Cir. 1983); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. EEOC,
691 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1982); Fox v. Brewer, 620 F.2d 177, 179 (8th Cir. 1980); Capital
Realty Invs., Inc. v. Watson, 608 F.2d 1137, 1143 (8th Cir. 1979); Compton v. Alton S.S. Co.,
608 F.2d 96, 102 (4th Cir. 1979); International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 670 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1977); District of Columbia Fed. of Civic Assns. v. Volpe, 520
F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Gila River Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 368 F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir.
1966); Schildhaus v. Moe, 335 F.2d 529, 530-31 (2d Cir. 1964); Sleek v. J.C. Penney Co., 292
F.2d 256, 258 (3d Cir. 1961). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (1982), the time for requesting an appeal
in ordinary civil action is 30 days, 60 days if the United States is a party, and 90 days if it is an
admiralty proceeding.
57. See, e.g., Parks v. United States Life & Credit Corp., 677 F.2d 838 (11th Cir. 1982);
Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., 542 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1976).
58. See note 27 supra.
59. Security Mut. Casualty Co. v. Century Casualty Co., 621 F.2d 1062, 1967 (10th Cir.
1980).
60. The one-year limit is not in full accord with the "reasonableness" interpretation recommended by this Note. However, since this Note deals with the recommended interpretation of
the rule as it now stands, and the rule states a per se one-year limit, this Part deals with an
interpretation of the rule within that one-year limit. When a case is appealed, it would better fit
the policy recommendation of this Note to eliminate the one-year limit and to allow correction
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Rule 60(b)(l) contains a "reasonable" time requirement with an
outside limit of one year. 61 One formulation of the reasonableness requirement, which has been accepted by some courts, 62 centers on potential prejudice to the opposing party due to delay in filing the
motion, considering as well whether the moving party had good reason for any delay. 63 Under this standard, the recommended interpretation satisfies the requirement of reasonableness, because before the
time for appeal has run out and while a judgment is on appeal the
parties recognize the possibility of reversal 64 and cannot justifiably rely
on finality of the judgment.65 Within this time period . the moving
party need not provide the court with a "good reason" for delay in
order to meet the rule's reasonable time requirement because delay
will not affect the interests of either the parties or the court. 66
The other approaches taken by the courts do not withstand analysis. The rationale behind the majority approach - that the motion
may be allowed only within the time allowed for filing of an appeal provides an equally strong argument for allowing a rule 60(b)(l) motion after the time for appeal has run if an appeal has been filed. The
majority reason that a cut-off policy is required to promote the finality
of judgments67 and to prevent the rule from being used as a substitute
for appeal. 68 However, the time between filing of a notice of appeal
and actual appellate court consideration of the case is 'also a time period during which judicial errors of law may be resolved, 69 thus conunder rule 60(b)(l) until the appellate court begins review of the case even if this is more than
one year after the trial court judgment.
In order to be consistent with the interest in finality and prevention of the use of rule 60(b)(l)
as a harmful substitute for appeal, the use of rule 60(b)(l) motions should be limited to the
appealing party, including the appellant in cross-appeals.
61. FED. R. Ctv. P. 60(b).
62. See, e.g., Security Mut. Casualty Co. v. Century Casualty Co., 621 F.2d 1062 (10th Cir.
1980); Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., 542 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1976).
63. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 43, §2866, at 228-29.
64. See text at note 72 infra.
65. "An appeal from the judgment ofa federal district court is a matter of right." Bray v.
United States, 370 F.2d 44, 46 (5th Cir. 1966).
66. According to the recommendation of this Note, the period between the judgment and the
expiration of the appeal deadline is a time of alternative remedies for obvious errors of law. After
judgment, a party has the option of using a rule 60(b)(l) motion or filing an appeal within the
time allowed for notice of appeal, usually 30 days. See note 56 supra. Therefore, there is no
"delay" until after the appeal period has expired and no appeal is filed. This rationale accords
with the interests espoused by the courts seeking to limit the application of rule 60(b)(l), including the interest in finality, see notes 68-73 infra and accompanying text; conservation of resources, see notes 87-88 infra and accompanying text; continued viability of rule 59, see notes 7476 infra and accompanying text; and prevention of the use of the rule as a substitute for timely
appeal, see note 86 infra and accompanying text.
67. See note 77 infra.
68. See 1 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 7, ~ 60.22[4]; cases cited at note 56
supra.
69. Although the circuits are not in accord as to the procedure required, jurisdiction can
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serving resources of both the appellate judicial system70 and the
litigating parties.71 Because the case is already on appeal, this conservation can be accomplished without any detriment to the perception of
a "final" judgment and without any prejudice to the opposing party.
As the Eleventh Circuit has observed: "During the pendency of an
appeal, the parties recognize the possibility of reversal; thus, modification of a judgment being appealed impacts not at all on finality concerns. " 72 The opposing party is not prejudiced, because the precise
point addressed in the motion was in issue at trial and would obviously
have been an issue - if not the only issue - on appeal. 73 Thus, a rule
usually be regained by the trial court after appeal has been taken and the trial court's jurisdiction
thereby divested. 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 7, 11 60.30[2].
One view is that the district court has the power to deny the motion on the merits after notice
of appeal without remand by the appellate court, because the district court's action is in furtherance of the appeal. See, e.g., Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., 542 F.2d 928, 930, 932 (5th Cir.
1976) ("If [the district court is] inclined to grant the motion, it so indicates and the movant can
then apply to the appellate court for remand for the trial court to enter its order."); Smith v.
Pollin, 194 F.2d 349, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
The other view is that the motion in such cases must be made to the appellate court in the
first instance and "the appellate court will grant [the motion] ..• only if there is a reasonable
showing that if leave is given, the trial court might properly grant the 60(b) motion." 7 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 7, 11 60.30[2], at 60-339. See, e.g., Smith v. Lujan, 588 F.2d
1304 (9th Cir. 1979); Lewis v. Penn Cent. Co., 459 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1972); Baruch v. Beech
Aircraft Co., 172 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1949).
Although Moore states that "[a]ny one of the procedures outlined above is workable," 7
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 7, 11 60.30[2], at 60-338, only the procedure outlined
in Lairsey is in accord with the policies of division of judicial labor and the prevention of duplication of effort.
In addition, Moore notes that
If the appellate court remands the case to the trial court for consideration of the 60(b)
motion, provision should be made in the remand order to the effect that if the trial court
denies the motion for relief, the appeal may then be reinstituted in the appellate court without any necessity to perfect a new appeal.
Id. at 60-337-38.
70. Judicial resources are saved by preventing duplicative efforts. See note 20 supra and
accompanying text.
71. The parties save substantial time and money by avoiding the appeal. See note 17 supra
and accompanying text.
72. Parks v. United States Life & Credit Corp., 677 F.2d 838, 841 (11th Cir. 1982); see also
Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., 542 F.2d 928, 931 (5th Cir. 1976) (concerns that 60(b) motions will upset the finality of judgments are minimized when the movant has also appealed the
trial court's decision).
Of course, there is an important interest in finality of litigation, but rule 60 itself addresses the
issue by placing an outside limit of one year on these motions. Presumably it was the drafters'
belief that beyond one year the system's need for finality would prevail, while within that period
the interest in finality would be considered in conjunction with the practical abilities of litigants
to become aware of possible grounds for 60(b)(l) relief. Also, the interest in finality has much
less force where the litigation is still pending on appeal.
73. See note 23 supra. The Fifth Circuit has applied the interpretation recommended by this
Note in Lairsey v. Advance Abrasives Co., 542 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1976), a case involving a
postjudgment change in controlling decisional law. In that case the movant filed a 60(b)(l) motion after the time for notice of appeal had run but while the appeal, which had been filed in a
timely manner, was still pending. The court, in allowing the motion, emphasized the fact that
rule 60(b)(1) "makes no mention of the period for noticing appeal or of whether notice of appeal
has been filed" and held that the time allowable for appeal was not a per se limitation on filing
the motion. 542 F.2d at 930.
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60(b)(l) motion should be allowed after the time for appeal has run if
an appeal has been filed, so long as the appellate court has not begun
its review of the case.
An even more restrictive approach has been taken by the First and
Seventh Circuits, which limit rule 60(b)(l) motions to the ten-day filing period specified in rule 59.74 These courts take the position that
any other interpretation undermines the effectiveness of rule 59. 75
This position assumes either that there can be no overlap between the
two rules or that if there is such an overlap it must be subject to the
limits of rule 59. While rule 59 can be used to correct judicial errors,
it serves many independent functions. Rule 59 should not dictate the
time limit for rule 60(b)(l) motions for the same reasons that it should
not preclude applying rule 60(b)(l) motions to judicial errors. 76
Some courts have taken a broad view of the time limits for rule
60(b)(l) motions, suggesting that the only per se limit should be the
one-year limit stated in the rule, with a determination of reasonableness made in each case. 77 The advantage of a rule having only the
one-year limit would be its flexibility, which would promote justice in
individual cases. 78 However, considerations of finality, 79 prevention of
the use of rule 60(b)(l) as a substitute for appeal, 80 conservation of
resources, 81 and speedy disposition of disputes82 militate against such
an approach.
The strong interest in finality of judgments requires a narrower
interpretation than the "one-year" rule can offer. The prevailing party
should be able to rely on a judgment obtained at a trial to which no
timely appeal has been filed. 83 The limited number of occasions in
which considerations of "reasonableness" might allow reopening an
unappealed case after the time for appeal has lapsed do not justify
74. See notes 25-27 supra.
75. See note 28 supra.
16. See notes 29-33 supra and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Security Mut. Casualty Co. v. Century Casualty Co., 621 F.2d 1062 (10th Cir,
1980). Although holding a motion 115 days after judgment untimely, the court in Security Mutual espoused a rule even more lenient than that recommended by this Note. The court examined the reasonableness of the 115-day delay even though the time for appeal had long since
passed and no appeal had been filed. The court held that although no prejudice was shown to the
opposing party by the delay, the motion would be denied because of the absence of any good
reason on the part of the movant for the delay.
78. See Recent Development, Civil Procedure - The Availability of Relief From a Final
Judgment For Reason of Judicial Mistake of Law Under Rule 60(b)(l) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure - Security Mutual Casualty Co. v. Century Casualty Co., 621 F.2d 1062 (10th
Cir. 1980), 16 TULSA L.J. 347, 350 (1980).
19. See notes 39-42 supra and accompanying text.
80. See notes 35 & 38 supra and accompanying text.
81. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
82. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
83. See note 66 supra.
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keeping all cases in limbo for one year. 84 "The resulting instability
would create chaos." 85
The use of a rule 60(b)(1) motion in an unappealed case after the
time for appeal has run constitutes an impermissible substitute for appeal and might in fact undermine the appellate process. Such a use
would negate the strict and necessary time requirements for appeal,
with little or no justifiable reason. 86 The interests in conservation of
judicial and party resources also argue against such a rule. 87 When
the trial court has made a decision, right or wrong, the party seeking
relief is required to take some action within the time allowed for appeal, by filing either notice of appeal or a rule 60 motion. After the
allowable time has expired, both the judicial system and the other parties are justified in relying on the finality of the judgment, and no further expenditure of time and effort by them should be required. 88
CONCLUSION

The recommended interpretation of rule 60(b)(l) - that such a
motion be allowed to correct obvious judicial errors of law within the
time allowed for appeal and, if an appeal has been filed, until the appellate court begins consideration of the case - adequately serves the
competing policy considerations involved. The recommended interpretation comprises the essential elements of the strong interest in finality of judgments, the preservation of the use of rule 60(b)(l) as a
substitute for the normal appellate process, and the interest in the continued viability of rule 59. In addition, limiting the timing and scope
of a rule 60(b)(1) motion satisfies the economic requirements of proper
division of labor that should lead to a more efficient functioning of the
entire judicial system.
84. Stated another way, the dual requirements of reasonableness - lack of prejudice to the
opposing party and good cause for the delay, see 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 43,
§ 2866, at 228-29 - will almost always be violated when the movant waits until the appeal
period has expired before filing the motion and when no appeal is filed. Therefore, an independent hearing on the question of reasonableness will be a wasted effort - merely a routine act to
create a record for review on appeal of denial of the motion. Even if the requirement of lack of
prejudice to the opposing party is satisfied, the requirement of good cause for the delay will
virtually never be satisfied. See, e.g., Security Mut. Casualty Co. v. Century Casualty Co., 621
F.2d 1062 (10th Cir. 1980).
85. Parks v. United States Life & Credit Corp., 677 F.2d 838, 841 (11th Cir. 1982).
86. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
87. See notes 15-24 supra and accompanying text.
88. This argument differs slightly from the "finality" argument, notes 39-42 supra and accompanying text, in that it is based on estoppel principles. The estoppel argument focuses on the
obligations of the moving party whereas the finality argument focuses on the notion that all
controversies must eventually come to an end, with the cause of this termination being irrelevant.

